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ESSAY
JOURNEYING THROUGH THE
VALLEY OF EVIL
DOUGLAS 0. LINDER*
Evil exists in the American legal system, according to Pro-
fessor Douglas 0. Linder. In this Essay, Professor Linder exam-
ines the current state of justice in America. His inspection
reveals a system where thoughtlessness and indifference under-
mine liberty and justice, and where injustices comparable to
those prevalent in Germany's Third Reich occur. Through sto-
ries of individual suffering, Professor Linder describes the insti-
tutional indifference to the human consequences of
decisionmaking that occurs when judges and political leaders be-
come swept away by popular causes and bureaucratic concerns.
He contends that such institutional indifference pervades our
legal system and is the evil that destroys liberty and shatters lives.
Professor Linder acknowledges that the courts and political lead-
ers have begun to respond to this evil by eliminating or modifying
programs that have caused the gravest injustices, but urges that
we must all become dedicated to individualized justice to ensure
that future injustices are prevented.
It is interesting to compare reactions to the words "injustice" and
"evil." Tell persons--especially persons who happen to be law profes-
sors-that you are researching the subject of injustice and a knowing and
vaguely approving look comes over their faces. They conclude that you
are a liberal (as they are, most likely) who wishes to investigate and ex-
pose the government's poor treatment of Haitians, welfare mothers,
criminal defendants, or some other downtrodden group. On the other
hand, tell these same people that you are exploring the subject of evil,
and they appear perplexed and slightly troubled, as though you had just
announced that you had visited relatives in the netherworld last week.
They seem unable to shake the word from its biblical or supernatural
associations and cannot understand what of any value could be said on
the subject of evil-if indeed such a thing exists.
Evil exists. The reality of evil in the world is no more problematic
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City, B.A., Gustavus Adolphus Col-
lege, J.D., Stanford University.
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than the reality of injustice. The two ideas are closely related. Behind an
act of injustice is often, although not always, evil.1 Where evil is present,
injustice often, although not surely, will follow.2 Injustices are acts that
violate a right or inflict an undeserved hurt. Evil is a source or aspect of
human nature that tends to cause injustices.
Injustice and evil both involve disproportionate suffering. Injustices
are undeserved hurts. Evil, in its primary sense, is what drives one to
"exceed due measure" or "overstep proper limits." 3 When severe pun-
ishment is inflicted upon the perpetrator of a serious wrong, neither evil
nor injustice may have much to do with the matter.
Good and evil are often thought of as opposites, but their relation-
ship is much more complex than that. Martin Buber, a Jewish theolo-
gian, examined the relationship between good and evil.' He concluded
that good was the product of a striving for truth and beauty.' Good does
not happen by accident: It comes from caring about and paying atten-
tion to noble goals. Evil, however, requires no such purposefulness. Evil
may come visiting whenever one strays from the path of truth and
beauty. Evil is the consequence of distractions and inattention.6
Whereas one must work to be good, one happens to be evil.
Americans usually do not think of evil in this way. We have been
conditioned by Hollywood, television, and politicians to expect evil to
come from the perverted and sadistic, from monsters and global conspir-
acies. Our villains are diabolic, given to demonic profundities. They are
Iago and Macbeth, Darth Vader and the Joker, Godless Communists and
All Those Behind the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Evil rarely has such a face. Hannah Arendt recognized "the banal-
ity of evil." 7 In Eichman in Jerusalem, a report on the trial of Adolf
Eichman, Arendt wrote that Eichman, far from having a desire "to prove
1. Despite their close relationship, injustice and evil can each exist in the absence of the
other. The execution of an innocent person may be a great injustice. If the execution followed
a fair trial with strong, but ultimately misleading, evidence suggesting the defendant's guilt,
however, it could not be said that evil caused the execution. Fate may sometimes be unkind,
but not evil.
2. Evil, as will be shown later, is more often associated with thoughtlessness than with an
evil design. Thoughtless patterns of behavior sometimes may stumble onto just outcomes, as
well as unjust outcomes.
3. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 909 (Compact ed. 1971).
4. MARTIN BUBER, GOOD AND EVIL: Two INTERPRETATIONS (1952).
5. Id. at 97.
6. Id.
7. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (2d ed. 1965).
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a villain,"8 sent thousands of Jews to their deaths merely because of "a
lack of imagination." 9 Eichman's only motive was looking out for his
personal advancement. According to Arendt, he "merely... never real-
ized what he was doing.""'
"The strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil"'" that
Arendt observed in Jerusalem underlies many of the injustices that have
dishonored the American legal system in recent years. Overidentification
with popular causes of the day and immersion in professional legal cul-
ture have blinded many of the key players in our justice system to the
human consequences of their decisions. Bureaucratic thinking has ena-
bled people who should know better to conclude that they are mere func-
tionaries who, if they did not do what they did, would watch as others
carried out the same injustices. Arendt concluded, from the Eichman
trial, that "remoteness from reality and thoughtlessness can wreak more
havoc than all the evil instincts taken together." 2 So, also, we might
conclude today.
If we look for classic villains as perpetrators of the evil in our crimi-
nal justice system, we will not find them. The evil that exists comes from
people who, like Eichman, are "terribly and terrifyingly normal."' 3
They include politicians who badly want to be reelected, frustrated and
possibly bored members of a sentencing commission with other priori-
ties, 4 district judges who hope to be appellate judges, appellate judges
8. Id. at 287. Arendt contends that it was Eichman's lack of imagination that
enabled him to sit for months on end facing a German Jew who was conducting the
police interrogation, pouring out his heart to the man and explaining again and again
how it was that he reached only the rank of lieutenant colonel in the S.S. and that it
had not been his fault that he was not promoted.
Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 288.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 276.
14. The United States Sentencing Commission publishes sentencing guidelines that deter-
mine sentence ranges for most federal crimes. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988). The Commission has
been criticized for not giving enough thought to special circumstances that should affect sen-
tencing. One commentator noted that "several members of the ... Commission apparently
considered their work so undemanding that they openly violated the statutory requirement of
full-time service on the Commission." Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guide-
lines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 951 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 992(c) (1990) (requiring full-time service on the commission). Judge Stephen G. Breyer
wrote 160 opinions for the First Circuit Court of Appeals during four years of service on the
Commission. Another Commissioner, Michael K. Block, moved from Washington to Tucson,
Arizona during his service, returning to Washington only about two days a month. Alschuler,
supra, at 951. Professor Alschuler contends that the Commissioners may not have appreciated
"the impact of the resolution of [sentencing] issues on people's lives." Id.
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who want fewer sentencing cases on their dockets, federal prosecutors
who do not look to see where their bandwagons are headed, and jurors
who merely want to go home. These people are not malicious. They are
nice to cats and small children. They are pleasant dinner guests. But
together they are responsible for more undeserved human suffering than
any of them would care to consider.
Evil in the modem American legal system has not escaped the atten-
tion of Judge Richard Posner. In a recent review of Ingo Muller's
Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich,"5 Judge Posner identified
disturbing parallels between American's legal system and that of Ger-
many's Third Reich. Judge Posner's concerns relate to virtually all the
major governmental players in our legal system. "[J]udges who impose
savage sentences on minor drug dealers" remind him of the German
judges who took pride in their role as "fighters on the internal bat-
tlefront, battlers against 'the enemy within.' "16 He wonders whether
prosecutors who pursue marijuana growers, "manipulators" of financial
markets, sellers of dirty magazines, and violators of arcane campaign fi-
nancing regulations are inappropriately using their offices in much the
same way as did prosecutors who earlier brought charges against
Germans for "dishonoring the race."17 In the decisions of legislators and
administrative officials marking the United States "as the most penal of
civilized nations today,"18 Judge Posner sees a "deeply problematic", 9
state of affairs that reflects, although perhaps not quite in degree, the
awesome severity of the criminal code in Nazi Germany. 0
Practices have gained judicial acceptance that would have been al-
most unimaginable in this country only two or three decades ago.
Among these are pretrial detention that leaves defendants languishing in
jail for two or more years while awaiting trial, the rapid expansion of the
death penalty and its authorization for use on teenagers, and application
of draconian forfeiture laws in cases involving only minute quantities of
contraband."1 Litigants attempting to challenge other unlawful or highly
15. Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36 (book
review).
16. Id. at 42.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. The United States Supreme Court has upheld these practices against constitutional
challenges. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that execution of
persons under 18 at time of crime "does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)
(finding certain extended pretrial detentions constitutional); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
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dubious practices, such as housing prisoners in inhumane conditions or
chokeholding persons suspected of minor traffic violations, have been
confronted with administrative and judicial obstacles that could frustrate
even the most patient and skillful plaintiffs' attorney. 2
Not all of the harshness and expanded prosecutorial powers in our
legal system can be justified as a response to public crisis. Severity of
punishment has increased out of proportion to the threat posed by many
criminal acts. Many persons face long prison terms for activities that
pose little, if any, threat to anyone's security. Even as rates for many
types of crimes dropped, punishment for these crimes grew more harsh.23
Similarly, the general willingness to allow the government to fine, con-
fine, search, research, drug, drug test, rough up, round up, and in other
ways cause individuals to suffer significant indignities has not depended
on the ability of government to demonstrate an increased need to adopt
these tactics. Deference to government is in vogue,24 and government
has made the most of the opportunities presented to it, often without
much regard for the human consequences of its decisions. Our jurispru-
dence, our institutions, and our politics increasingly deny or ignore the
basic humanity of prisoners, criminal defendants, and targets of govern-
ment suspicion.
This Essay attempts to show that injustices are real and that real
people are responsible for them. It examines the patterns of thinking and
behavior that lead to injustices. Finally, this Essay attempts to chart a
course through "the valley of evil" 25 that takes account of human weak-
nesses and bureaucratic realities.
I. SEARCHING FOR EVIL
Evil rarely announces itself. It slips in quietly, usually under an as-
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (finding seizure of yacht for marijuana violation
constitutional).
22. See, eg., Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991) (holding that prisoners who
allege prison conditions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" must show "deliberate
indifference" by responsible officials); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)
(finding that a person seeking to enjoin police practice of employing chokeholds has no stand-
ing unless he can establish substantial likelihood of being choked again).
23. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BJS DATA REPORT 1989,
at 17 (1990).
24. David Stewart, Advantage Government, A.B.A. J. 46 (July, 1992). Justice Stevens
recently complained of "a special privilege for the Federal Government." United States v.
Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1748 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reversing the district court's
dismissal of indictment for failure of the prosecution to disclose to the grand jury "substantial
exculpatory evidence" in its possession).
25. The metaphor is inspired by the 23rd Psalm: "Even though I journey through the
valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil." Psalm 23:4 (Revised Standard Version).
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sumed name. If not for its frequent companion, injustice, it would be
hard to spot at all. Injustice itself is often difficult to recognize because it
takes many forms.
Many instances of governmental injustice in our nation's history do
not directly involve punishment through the criminal justice system.
Governmental support of the institution of slavery26 and displacement of
Native Americans from their traditional lands27 are two examples of in-
justices outside the criminal justice system. Eager governmental support
for the causes of economic development and western expansion has taken
its victims as well. More recently, overzealous pursuit of abstract-
sometimes commendable-goals such as environmental quality, affirma-
tive action, and respect for life has taken a heavy toll on particular indi-
viduals whose interests were ignored or sacrificed in the rush to serve
those goals.
Nowhere, however, is the potential for evil to cause injustices
greater than in the context of the criminal justice system. The criminal
justice system separates persons from their loved ones, causes physical
and emotional scars, denies individuals many of their most basic free-
doms, and even takes lives. Many of the clearest cases of governmental
injustice are drawn from the criminal justice system. It was through its
Reich Ministry of Justice that the Nazis worked their profound evil
against Jews, Poles, homosexuals, and other victims of Nazi hatred.28 In
our own country, we can point to examples of gross injustice such as the
hangings of suspected witches in Salem Village and the guilty verdicts
that almost sent eight black teenagers, "the Scottsboro Boys," to their
deaths for a rape that they almost certainly did not commit.29 The video-
taped Los Angeles police beating of Rodney King in 1991 is but the latest
striking example of how a system designed to provide justice sometimes
serves up its opposite.
There is no public injustice so great that it will not have its defend-
ers, but that does not mean that injustice exists merely in the eye of the
beholder. If injustice is but a superstition, then so are all the shared
moral values upon which a community depends. It is a testament to the
modern obsession with the empirically verifiable that there are critics
26. For an account of governmental support of slavery, including the 1850 fugitive slave
law and Dred Scott, see generally RUSSEL NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1963).
27. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 443-44 (1973).
28. See ROGER GOODMAN, THE FIRST GERMAN WAR CRIMES TRIAL i-iii (n.d.).
29. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 239-40
(1970).
[Vol. 711116
who argue that we should "see through" questions of justice.30 As C. S.
Lewis noted, "the whole point of seeing through something is to see
something through it.",3 1 If someone insists on proof that an injustice is
really an injustice, it may not be possible to satisfy him. Ultimately, no-
tions of justice and injustice involve weighing public and plivate interests
and will often lead persons to different conclusions in specific cases. It
should not be necessary to coax reluctant agreement from the last de-
fender of the Third Reich's policy before we call the Holocaust an injus-
tice; neither should the absence of unanimous opinion be a bar to
conclusions about injustices today. "Takings" jurisprudence suggests
limitations on how much sacrifice the government can ask of a private
property owner before compensation is exacted. Injustices can be similar
to takings in that they involve situations where the government has asked
an individual to give up too much in order to achieve a public goal-too
much property, too much liberty, or too much physical security.
Injustices usually occur when the human consequences of decisions
are ignored or undervalued. This happens when the decisionmaker fo-
cuses her attention elsewhere. The "elsewhere" where attention might be
focused is as diverse as those individuals who make the offending deci-
sions. Eichman's trial in Jerusalem showed him to be a normal man who
was able to inflict great human suffering because his own career advance-
ment so occupied his thoughts as to make him almost oblivious to the
effects his decisions were having on people.32 Twelve jurors in the infa-
mous "Scottsboro Boys" rape trial of 1933 were able to vote to send
innocent teenage blacks in Alabama to the electric chair after only min-
utes of deliberation-and to laugh about it on their way back to their
jury seats33 -not because the jurors were foul and despicable people, but
because they were less concerned with doing individual justice than with
vindicating a justice system. William Calley could order that Vietnamese
women and children be massacred at My Lai because he had become
conditioned to think of his victims as "the enemy," not as human be-
ings. 34 Calley's answer to the question of whether he discussed the kill-
ings with his superior officers is revealing of his indifference: "No sir
.... It wasn't any big deal, sir." 35
Although the roots of indifference remain many and varied, two ten-
30. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 90-91 (MacMillan paperback ed. 5th prtg.
1968).
31. Id. at 91.
32. ARENDT, supra note 7, at 276.
33. CARTER, supra note 29, at 239.
34. JOSEPH Di MONA, GREAT COURT-MARTIAL CASES 271-72 (1972).
35. Id. at 274.
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dencies seem especially pronounced in the American legal system of the
early 1990s. Working either separately or together, these two factors are
responsible for much unnecessary suffering. One is a tendency for play-
ers in the justice system to overidentify with causes-popular causes or
causes that have become key parts of an administration's agenda. The
second is the tendency, especially apparent among judges, to become
blind to certain consequences of their decisions due to an immersion in
their professional culture.36 That such immersion is today generally ap-
plauded, and even rewarded, has only exacerbated this tendency.
A. Overidentification with Causes
Few would deny that a politician, prosecutor, judge, or administra-
tive official could come to identify so strongly with a cause that his ca-
pacity to do justice to individuals might be diminished. In his eagerness
to serve his cause, he may neglect to consider as fully as he should the
harm that will fall on persons adversely affected by his decisions. Obvi-
ously, the story of the German judiciary during the Third Reich is an
extreme example of overidentification with a popular cause. Ultraconser-
vative German judges used what Judge Posner has called the extraordi-
nary "plasticity" of law37 to produce decisions that infficted enormous
harm on Jews, Poles, homosexuals, and other targets of Nazi hatred. As
one judge stated, "Eliminating the last traces of the enemy within is un-
doubtedly a part of the restoration of German honor. German judges
can participate in this task through generous interpretation of the penal
code."3 Another leader of the profession put the matter even more
bluntly by suggesting that German judges "make value judgments which
correspond to the National Socialist legal order and the will of the polit-
ical leadership."' 9 The Nuremberg tribunal's decision in The Justice
Case recounts the grim tale of German judges creatively interpreting
Nazi law to reach death sentences for Jews accused of such minor viola-
tions as hoarding eggs.'
36. This tendency has been noted by scholars. For example, Professor Lon Fuller, writing
an opinion for a justice in an imaginary case, warned of "the danger that we may get lost in the
patterns of our own thought and forget that these patterns often cast not the slightest shadow
on the outside world." Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv.
616, 642 (1949).
37. Posner, supra note 15, at 42.
38. Id. at 38.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Alstoetter et al., in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 100-26 (1951).
The defendants in the Nuremburg trials were charged with common design and conspiracy,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in a criminal organization. Id. at 115-
26.
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In the United States, of course, the official conservative dogma as-
serts that judges are to interpret the law, not make the law."1 Thoughtful
judges, whether liberal or conservative, understand that to be impossible.
The title of an essay by Judge Posner, What Am I-A Potted Plant?,
suggests that he is a judge who recognizes that subjective value judg-
ments strongly influence judicial decisions.42 As he candidly stated,
"Judges-not all, but most-who are sympathetic to the principles and
the policies of the government they serve will decide cases in harmony
with those principles and policies, and those who are not won't."'43
Identification with administration policies is even more pronounced
among prosecutors, administrative officials, and politicians, all of whom
are free from the need to be perceived as objective and above politics.
Members of Congress, federal agency officials, and attorneys for the
United States are often outspoken in their support of programs that are
high on an administration's or the public's agenda. While pornography,
drugs, insider trading, or pollution rise and fall as administration en-
forcement priorities, so also does the rhetoric on these dangers emanating
from the congressional chambers, the commission meeting rooms, and
the offices of district attorneys.
No cause was more popular during the 1980s than the "War on
Crime." Government has been fighting crime for centuries, of course,
but rising crime rates beginning in the late sixties made "law and order"
a virtually indispensable slogan for any politician hoping to get elected.
The fact that rising crime rates at the time had less to do with govern-
mental neglect of citizen security than with an increase in the number of
persons in the prime crime-producing years mattered little. Whether as a
politician, a U.S. attorney, or an elected judge, it became important to
"talk tough" about crime.
Some good has come from our two decades of the war on crime.
Although probably more a result of an aging population than anything
else, there have been recent improvements in some crhne statistics.'
41. This view is most closely associated with President Reagan, though it is a view that
President Bush apparently shared. Former Attorney General Edwin Meese has presented the
case for this view in numerous forums, including in a speech entitled "The Law of the Consti-
tution," delivered October 21, 1986, at Tulane University. Edwin Meese, The Law and the
Constitution, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION?: THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE
AUTHORITY 1 (The Federalist Society 1992).
42. Richard Posner, What Am I-A Potted Plant?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987,
at 23.
43. Posner, supra note 15, at 41.
44. Crime rates in most offense categories declined during the 1980s. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BJS DATA REPORT 1989, at 17 (1990).
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Others have gotten much worse.45 It is not the intention here to assess
the costs and benefits of recent changes in the criminal code or rules of
criminal procedure. Rather, the goal is to identify how sloganism, polit-
ical posturing, careerism, and bandwagoning have caused gross miscar-
riages of justice in individual cases. In particular, overzealous pursuit of
causes such as "the war on drugs" and "the war on pornography" have
brought trial judges to tears and resignations, and have shattered the
lives of individual defendants and their families.
These are populist times. "Give the people what they want" is the
prevailing philosophy in Washington and most state capitols. If the peo-
ple are thought to want harsher criminal penalties, the impetus is to en-
act harsher penalties. If opinion polls favor drug testing, pretrial
detention, or executions, then those issues are certain to receive substan-
tial support among politicians. This is not the sort of government that
the framers of the Constitution had in mind. James Madison warned
against the hasty enactment of laws based on enthusiasms of the day. In
The Federalist Papers, Madison wrote that a republic must "refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a cho-
sen body of citizens, whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. ' 46 Contrary to
Madison's hopes, elected officials have largely surrendered their judg-
ment to public opinion polls. Especially on the issues of crime and pun-
ishment, hypersensitivity to popular attitudes has banished reason from
debate.
An example of how populism has reworked our criminal law is the
"severity revolution"'47 of the last decade or so. People are thought to
want harsher criminal penalties.4" The result has been a bidding war
sending sentences to the point where, according to Judge William
Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, "no other industrial-
ized country imposes sentences of comparable severity."49 Our incarcer-
ation rate of 426 prisoners for every 100,000 residents ranks well ahead
45. Id. The number of personal crimes, such as personal theft and crimes of violence, has
increased since 1980.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
47. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 903. Maximum sentences as set by the legislature actually
began increasing early in the twentieth century. RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENC-
ING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 2 (1979).
48. Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views of
Sentencing, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 459 (1990).
49. William Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCE REP. 339,
341 (1991).
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of second-place South Africa's 333.10 Changes in sentencing laws guar-
antee prison time for many offenders who should be dealt with in other
ways. Draconian mandatory minimum sentences have been enacted in
response to the perceived "lock-'em-up-and-throw-away-the-key" atti-
tude of the public." The death penalty has been adopted for a growing
list of crimes, and its application sanctioned even for teenage defend-
ants.52 Reasoned debate has been swept aside in the rush to satisfy the
public's perceived desire for more severe and certain punishments.5 3
What has been conspicuously lacking is attention to consequences other
than the obvious political consequences of not supporting a popular mea-
sure. Ironically, recent research suggests that if the public understood
how tough sentences actually are, they would be more inclined to move
toward greater leniency than greater severity.
5 4
Our approach to justice issues is increasingly abstract and collectiv-
ist. Professor Albert W. Alschuler has called current American legal.and
social thought "the bottom-line collectivist-empirical mentality."55 Poli-
ticians, administrators, and judges are less concerned with achieving jus-
tice between parties than with "speculating about the customary
behavior of large groups."56 Individuals do not count for as much as
they used to. Arguments about social utility have obscured the fact that
justice is, in Lloyd Weinreb's words, "insistently individual."57
50. MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
RATES OF INCARCERATION 3 (Sentencing Project, 1991).
51. See discussion infra accompanying notes 59-111.
52. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming death sentence for seven-
teen-year-old convicted of murder, sodomy, robbery, and receiving stolen property).
53. Eric Sterling, a Staff member of the House Judiciary Committee, described the process
of setting criminal penalties:
The way in which these sentences were arrived at-it was like an auction house ....
It was this frenzied, panic atmosphere-I'll see your five years and I'll raise you five
years. It was the crassest political poker game. Nobody looked and said these
sentences are going to have the following effect on the courtrooms and around the
country, on street comers and on the prisons.
United States v. Scott, 757 F. Supp. 972, 980 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (citing Michael Isikoff & Tracey
Thompson, Getting Tough on Drugs: Draconian Sentences Jurt Small Offenders More Than
Kingpins, WASH. POST, Nov.4, 1990, at Cl).
54. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 938.
55. Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work" The Exclusionary Rule
after Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 346.
56. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 904. Alschuler believes that misleading discussion of
"group rights," speculation about group behavior, and aggregate judicial management have
left society "increasingly indifferent to individual cases and small numbers." Id. at 905.
57. LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JuSTICE 229 (1987).
1993] EVIL 1121
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1. Three Stories
Justice is "insistently individual."58 References to justice for ethnic
groups or categories of offenders are really assertions about social utility.
The working of evil is most obviously exposed in the undeserved suffer-
ing of individuals, not in general observations about the mistreatment of
criminal defendants or suspects. With that in mind, the following section
examines three injustices and the evil that made each possible.
a. Richard Anderson, Oakland Longshoreman
In 1989, Richard Anderson was a forty-nine year old longshoreman
in Oakland, California.5 9 Anderson had no criminal record and a reputa-
tion after twenty-four years on the docks as a reliable worker.' Ander-
son's troubles began when he was waved down on an Oakland Street by
an acquaintance.61 The acquaintance asked Anderson to drive him to a
Burger King a few miles away, and Anderson complied. At the Burger
King a federal agent posing as a drug customer went to Anderson's truck
and picked up the 100 grams of crack that Anderson's acquaintance had
with him.62 Anderson was tried before a jury on charges of violating
federal drug trafficking laws. The jury concluded that Anderson knew he
was driving his acquaintance to a drug deal.63
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986" provides for a mandatory pen-
alty of ten years without the possibility of parole for those participating
in a transaction involving over fifty grams of crack.6 The Act focuses on
the weight of the drugs; a person's prior record or degree of participation
in the crime is irrelevant. 6
58. Id.
59. New Drug Law Leaves No Room for Mercy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1989, at 28, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap File.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Anderson testified at the trial that he knew nothing of the drug deal. Katherine
Bishop, Mandatory Sentences in Drug Cases: Is the Law Defeating Its Purpose?, N.Y. TIMES,
June. 8, 1990, at B16.
64. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the U.S.C.). Mandatory sentence provisions were further strengthened by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (making relevant amendments
to titles 18, 21, and 28 of the United States Code).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1990). The possession of five grams of crack-the weight of five
paper clips--carries a mandatory sentence of five years. Id. § 844.
66. Federal Judge Jon 0. Newman of Connecticut has called basing punishment on the
amount of drugs carried or sold" 'incremental immorality.'" David Margolick, Justice By the
Numbers: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al (quoting Judge Jon D.
Newman).
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United States District Judge William Schwarzer imposed the ten-
year minimum prison term on Anderson on September 8, 1989.67
Schwarzer fought back tears as he said to those assembled in his court-
room: "We are required to follow the rule of law... [b]ut in this case
the law does anything but serve justice.... It may profit us very little to
win the war on drugs if in the process we lose our soul."68
b. Kevin Hogan, Alaska Fisherman
On May 8, 1988, Kevin Hogan and a crew of three headed for
Alaska in a $140,000 fishing boat he had just purchased in Washington.69
The boat developed engine problems along the route and was forced to
stop brief7y in Canada for repairs.70 The Canadian stop was reported to
customs agents in Ketchikan, who searched the boat.71 The search re-
vealed that one of Hogan's three crew members had 1.7 grams of mari-
juana in his jacket.72 Customs officials acknowledged that Hogan knew
nothing about the marijuana aboard his boat, the Hold Tight.73
Under the "Zero Tolerance" program initiated less than two months
earlier, even small amounts of drugs could result in arrests and
forfeitures of property.7 4 Customs agents decided to seize Hogan's
boat.75 Hogan had planned to use the boat during Alaska's twenty-four
hour halibut season later that month.76 The halibut catch could have
netted Hogan the $40,000 he needed to pay the mortgage on the Hold
Tight.77 Hogan said as a result of the seizure, "I stand to lose it all in this
deal," referring to everything for which he had worked during the prior
78fifteen years. In Hogan's hometown of Homer, Alaska, more than
1,000 people signed petitions supporting Hogan. The city council passed
a resolution urging that Customs officials show "some sense of propor-
tionality" in the Hogan case.79
The Customs Service expressed its position in a letter written by
67. Bishop, supra note 63, at B16.
68. Id.
69. Fisherman, Drug Program in Standoff, CH. TRIB., June 3, 1988, § 1, at 18.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. "Zero Tolerance" Drug Battle Called Overkill, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap File.
75. Fisherman, Drug Program in Standoff, supra note 69, at 18.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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John Elkins, acting director of the Service's regulatory procedures and
penalties division in Washington, D.C., to the Customs Service's
Anchorage office. Elkins said that it is not enough to warn crew mem-
bers of the drug program, as Hogan said he had done.80 Elkins con-
tended that Hogan was negligent in not detecting the marijuana: "It is
our view that Kevin Hogan was, as owner and master, responsible for the
actions of crew members. '8 1
c. Robert Brase, Nebraska Farmer
"Project Looking Glass" was the name given to a U.S. Postal Ser-
vice investigation designed to uncover purchasers of child pornogra-
phy. 2 The Postal Service apparently obtained names of potential targets
for the investigation from raids of distributors of nudity-oriented
videotapes.83
Robert Brase was a farmer from Shelby, Nebraska. 4 In 1987, he
had been married for ten years and was the father of two children.85 He
had no criminal record, and there was no evidence that he had ever sexu-
ally abused children. 6 Brase's name apparently turned up on a mailing
list found during the raid of a California video distributor.87 There was
no evidence that Brase had ever ordered an X-rated video or violated any
of the nation's obscenity laws. 8 The Postal Service, as part of Project
Looking Glass, mailed Brase a catalog advertising videos depicting mi-
nors engaged in sexual activity.89 Brase ordered a video tape.90 Less
than one hour after the tape reached Brase's Nebraska farm home, a
team of postal inspectors arrived and searched Brase's home.91 The only
child pornography discovered was the tape received from the U.S. Postal
Service.92
On October 22, 1987, a grand jury in Omaha indicted Brase for al-
legedly receiving by mail a videotape showing minors engaged in sexually
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Frank Kuznik, Operation Borderline, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1988, at 45.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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explicit conduct.93 Eleven days later, Robert Brase drove his pickup
truck to a seldom-used county road nine miles from Shelby and shot
himself.94 Brase was one of four persons indicted in the government
sting operation to commit suicide.95
H. Robert Showers, executive director of the Justice Departments of
National Obscenity Enforcement Unit, defended the sting operation:
"When normal law enforcement techniques don't work to solve a prob-
lem, you have to go to new ones."9 6 Showers denied any responsibility
for the suicides: "This kind of sting is designed to penetrate into these
underground, secretive operations, and we get some well-regarded people
in the community-high-ranking professional people, persons who are
considered upstanding citizens. In those circumstances, something like
suicide is to be expected."97
2. What Went Wrong?
Anderson, Hogan, and Brase were not treated well by our justice
system. Each was punished far more severely than his own conduct war-
ranted. Anderson's decision to drive his drug-dealing acquaintance to
the Burger King was surely a mistake in judgment, but it was a spontane-
ous response to a request for assistance. Many, if not most, people would
have made the same decision. Hogan's decision not to search his crew
members for evidence of marijuana hardly can be called negligent, let
alone be categorized as misconduct justifying what effectively amounted
to a multi-thousand dollar penalty which threatened bankruptcy and loss
of livelihood. Brase's interest in child pornography only arguably de-
serves the label "criminal." The criminal sanction should be reserved for
producers of child pornography, not for consumers like Brase whose
voyeuristic interests may be biological in origin.98
93. Brase, UPI, Nov. 3, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Brase was
indicted for violating the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2216, 2251-2257; 28 U.S.C. § 522 (1988)). The act criminalizes the
knowing receipt through the mails of a "visual depiction [that] involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1990).
94. Brase, UPI, Nov. 3, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
95. Lawrence A. Stanley, The Child Porn Myth, 7 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 295, 325
(1989). Project Looking Glass and Operation Borderline, a related sting operation imple-
mented by United States Customs, resulted in about 225 indictments. Id.
96. Kuznik, supra note 82, at 45.
97. Id.
98. While recognizing the State's interests in protecting the victims of child pornography
and attempting to solve this problem, the Government takes the position that punishment of
consumers is necessary because it is difficult to identify and punish the producers of child
pornography. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). Evidence is mounting that sexual
predilections previously thought to be environmental in origin may have a biological basis.
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The injustices suffered by Anderson, Hogan, Brase, and thousands
like them originated in the overidentification with popular causes by per-
sons far removed from Oakland, Homer, and Shelby. Indifference to the
human consequences of these decisions made each of these injustices
possible.
a. Manditory Minimums
Richard Anderson was sentenced under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.11 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was a product of the politics of
crime and the "severity revolution" that those politics created. Under
the law's mandatory minimum sentences, first-time participation in a
drug trafficking crime involving over five kilograms of cocaine or fifty
grams of crack results in a minimum ten-year prison sentence without
any opportunity for parole.I" ° The sentence applies regardless of the de-
fendant's age, criminal background, mental abilities, family status, drug
history, or degree of participation in the crime.101 Driving a drug dealing
acquaintance to the Burger King assures a ten-year minimum sentence
no less than engaging in the kind of drug dealing that congressional sup-
porters of the minimum sentence had in mind when they voted for the
legislation.
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd first proposed the mandatory
minimum sentence provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Senator
Byrd, who called mandatory minimum sentences "really just a matter of
common sense," 10 2 argued that it was important that a drug dealer
"know that there will be no escape hatch through which he can avoid a
term of years in the penitentiary." 103 The minimums were designed to
counter the problem of "revolving door justice."' Byrd stated his in-
tentions to "put these criminals in jail, lock the door, and for a lengthy
period of time refuse to permit anyone to use the key to let them out."' '
Studies on differences between the brains of homosexuals and heterosexuals, for example, point
to a possible biological basis for homosexuality. Marilyn Elias, Differences Seen in Brains of
Gay Men, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 1992, at 8D. Other researchers have attempted to explain the
vastly greater interest in pornography among males in socio-biological terms. See, e.g., DON-
ALD SYMONs, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 180-84 (1979). I offer this evidence
only to illustrate the point that sexual preferences may be biologically based and not to suggest
any correlation between homosexuality and interest in child pornography.
99. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1992).
101. Id.
102. 132 CONG. REc. S14,301 (1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The law was meant to deal especially harshly with what the Senator
called "kingpins." According to Byrd, kingpins could be "identified by
the amount of drugs with which they [were] involved." 10 6
The decision to base prison terms on the quantity of drugs involved,
however, leads to much injustice. Had Richard Anderson's acquaintance
been carrying forty-nine grams of crack instead of more than fifty, An-
derson would have faced a mandatory five years in jail instead of ten.
Yet the quantity of drugs involved had nothing to do with Anderson's
culpability. Even if one rejects Anderson's contention that he did not
know his acquaintance was carrying drugs, it is almost inconceivable that
Anderson quizzed his rider about whether he was dealing more or less
than fifty grams. Chance, rather than some considered willingness to
deal drugs in substantial quantities, explains why Anderson was
sentences to ten years-not five-in a federal penitentiary.
By ignoring offender characteristics and levels of participation, Con-
gress has created a system that treats lookouts and couriers as harshly as
it does those who plan and reap the benefits of drug trafficking. It is "the
mules," poor and often naive couriers, that usually get caught. 0 7 Judge
Judith N. Keep provided an analysis of the situation in her San Diego
area district: "'What we frequently see.., are the mules.... They often
have no prior criminal record, just a financial crisis. They take a chance
and they get caught.' "108 An example of the type of defendants now
filling America's federal prisons because of the mandatory minimum
sentences are impoverished Nigerians who attempt to finance trips to the
United States by agreeing to swallow and deliver condoms containing
quantities of heroin.10 9 Judge Raymond J. Dearie of Brooklyn reported
"'hundreds' " of such "'tragic'" cases in his New York courtroom, 10
adding that these defendants were generally decent people who acted out
of desperation.1
Some federal district judges have been so upset at the prospect of
imposing the severe mandatory minimum sentences on low-level couriers
that they have devised ways to avoid doing so. Judge Alfredo Marquez
of California refused to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on a
"mule" hired in Mexico to drive a car containing drugs to the United
States. Judge Marquez ruled that imposition of the five-year sentence
would violate the defendant's due process rights under the Fifth Amend-
106. Id.
107. Bishop, supra note 63, at B16.
108. Id. (quoting Judge Judith N. Keep).
109. David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1992, at B7.
110. Id. (quoting Judge Raymond J. Dearie).
111. Id.
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ment.112 Judge James Lawrence King of Florida had the responsibility
of sentencing an eighty-three year old courier facing a mandatory ten-
year sentence; instead, Judge King sentenced the man to less than two
months in prison, saying that Congress never intended to imprison a man
of his age for a decade or more."1 '
Justice does not mean treating every case the same. Justice depends
on treating similar cases similarly. There is no justice in giving identical
sentences to both jaywalkers and kidnappers. Nor is it just to punish
Richard Anderson for driving an acquaintance to the Burger King as
harshly as his passenger, who planned the drug deal and who expected to
benefit greatly from its completion. Professor Albert Alschuler has ob-
served that "appropriate sentences depend upon circumstances that we
cannot quite name.""1 4 Generally, aggravating and mitigating factors
are recognized in individual cases, but all consideration of them is pre-
cluded by the Anti-Drug Abuse law.
Why would Congress enact legislation certain to create victims of
injustice like Richard Anderson? The answer, of course, is not that Con-
gress thought about people like Richard Anderson (or about eighty-three
year old couriers, or desperate Nigerians) and cruelly and deliberately
decided to punish them harshly. Rather, the problem was that Congress
did not consider carefully the human consequences of its decision. The
legislation was supported by conservatives and liberals alike,I1 I and there
was no genuine floor debate on the mandatory minimum sentence provi-
sion. Congressional records concerning recent legislation to adopt
mandatory minimum sentences, for example, are virtually devoid of dis-
cussion as to how the new laws might affect certain categories of defend-
ants less blameworthy than those "kingpins" whose examples peppered
debates. Few asked whether the laws might cause prison overcrowding,
or whether potential overcrowding might exacerbate already dangerous
prison conditions. No one in Congress had the prescience to inquire
whether the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences in certain
cases could demoralize the best members of the judiciary, and even drive
112. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 754 F. Supp. 1401, 1406-09 (D. Ariz. 1990), rev'd,
955 F.2d 1296, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992). Judge Marquez's position is not widely shared. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cobbins, 749 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (E.D. La. 1990) (holding that a defendant
has no due process right to have his sentence determined by a judge).
113. Miami Judge Rejects Sentencing Guidelines, THE WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at B5.
114. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 915.
115. Senator Strom Thurmond, a Republican of South Carolina, and Senator Edward Ken-
nedy, a Democrat of Massachusetts, were co-sponsors of the Sentencing Reform Act. It
passed 392-16 in the House and 97-2 in the Senate. President Reagan signed the legislation
into law. David Margolick, Full Spectrum of Judicial Critics Assail Prison Sentencing Guides,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al, A40.
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some outstanding judges from the bench. No one, it seemed, was willing
to risk the political heat that could result from questioning the propriety
of a tough sentence for drug offenders. Given that many members of
Congress may have themselves violated drug laws, one might have ex-
pected more concern about tough mandatory sentences. More than half
of all high school seniors have smoked marijuana,116 as have Supreme
Court nominees and President Bill Clinton." 7 Even voices of modera-
tion on the Anti-Drug Abuse bill, such as Senator Joseph Biden of Dela-
ware, however, found it necessary to preface floor remarks with the
suggestion that a nineteen-year old possessing two grams of marijuana
"is not something to take lightly."11 8
There was a time when Congress might have rejected simplistic so-
lutions such as mandatory minimum sentences. Political outcomes were
at one time determined more by relatively stable coalitions organized
along party lines.1 19 Television has changed the nature of politics. Poli-
ticians depend upon short-term voter approval. They ride along on the
currents of the temporary enthusiasms of the day, dreading the possibil-
ity that a controversial position taken on principle might inspire an oppo-
nent to produce a negative thirty-second commercial at election time.
Many persons who at one time publicly opposed mandatory minimum
sentences have changed their positions. President George Bush, for ex-
ample, while a congressman from Texas in 1970, argued that the elimina-
tion of mandatory minimum sentences "will result in better justice and
more appropriate sentences."1 20
The unwillingness to examine the human impact of mandatory min-
imum sentences under the 1986 legislation in large part stemmed from
public demands for stern action against drug dealers. Public pressure for
tough new penalties for drug crimes was not surprising in view of the
steady flow of alarmist headlines and stories about drug use that ap-
peared in the mid-1980s. A Newsweek" cover story, for example, de-
116. Adam P. Weisman, I Was a Drug-Hype Junkie, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1986, at
14, 16.
117. The nomination of Judge Douglas Ginsburg was withdrawn after reports that he had
used marijuana on several occasions. See Kenneth B. Noble, Aides Say Reagan's Stance on
Ginsburg Contradicts Policy on Drug Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1987, at 33. President Bill
Clinton has admitted trying marijuana (though not inhaling) while a student at Oxford Uni-
versity. Anne Senior, A Beard, A Pink Suit and Marijuana Puffs-Clinton at Oxford,
REUTERS, Oct. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File.
118. 132 CONG. Rc. S14,077 (1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
119. See THEODORE Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED 97 (1985).
120. 116 CONG. REc. H33,314 (1970) (statement of Representative Bush). George Bush
later became a strong supporter of mandatory minimum sentences. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Taking
Issue, AM. LAW., Dec. 1992, at 61.
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scribed drug usage in America as an epidemic "as pervasive and as
dangerous in its way as the plagues of medieval times." '' It was only
one of three Newsweek cover stories on drug abuse to run within a five-
month period in 1986. Network news shows ran almost daily stories on
the subject, and drugs were the subject of news documentaries on prime-
time television.1 2
2
What is remarkable about the extensive media coverage prior to the
passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is that it took place while
statistics showed a general decline in drug usage.123 Use of marijuana,
hallucinogens, stimulants, sedatives, and barbiturates has been declining
since 198 1. 24 Use of heroin and PCPs remains steady.12 5 Only statistics
on cocaine use showed a recent increase-from sixteen percent of all high
school seniors during the years 1982 to 1984 to seventeen percent in 1985
(the same percentage that had experimented with the drug in 1981).126
Interestingly, even the adoption of new draconian sentences in 1986
and 1988 did little to satisfy the public perception that drug laws were
not tough enough. The percentage of the public in favor of tougher drug
trafficking penalties actually increased during the 1980s, from seventy-
nine percent to eighty-five percent.27 Such poll results coupled with a
growing fear of the thirty-second negative campaign advertisement
("Senator Shmoe voted AGAINST new penalties for the drug traffickers
that prey on our school children") help explain the politics of drugs.
The public that told pollsters that it wanted tougher penalties for
drug dealers was not thinking of people like Richard Anderson. Richard
Anderson is like a porpoise caught in a drift net. He was not what Con-
gress wanted to catch, but he was caught nonetheless under its indiscrim-
inate definition of drug trafficking. No one-not the Congress that
passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, not the judges who must enforce it, not
the public that said it wanted tougher penalties-wants to see people like
Richard Anderson spend ten years in already overcrowded federal pris-
ons. Unfortunately, however, he will.
The evil responsible for locking Richard Anderson away for ten
121. Weisman, supra note 116, at 15 (quoting Richard M. Smith, The Plague Among Us;
The Drug Crises, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at 15).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Of course, trends on drug use tell only part of the story. There is no denying that
drugs are widely used in the United States. Over half of all 1986 high school seniors tried
marijuana, and between three and five million Americans used cocaine each month during
1986. Id. at 16.
127. John M. Greacen, Report to Members, CRIM. JusT., Winter 1988 (n.d.).
1130 [Vol. 71
years lies in the unwillingness of the media and Congress to take seri-
ously his plight and the plight of people like him. The media has been
more interested in hype than facts. Stories of drug-related killings re-
ceive heavy media attention; seldom appears a headline that reads,
"Nineteen Year-Old Drug Courier Gets Harsh Sentence." Meanwhile,
members of Congress have been more interested in positioning them-
selves for reelection than in improving the quality of justice.
Someday we will declare a victory in our war against drugs, and
reason may then return to our approach to drug trafficking. The first
signs of this happening are federally mandated studies128 on the effects of
mandatory minimum drug sentences. 129 These studies show prison over-
crowding, growing health problems in an aging prison population, and
large numbers of "small fish" receiving "big fish" sentences. 130  The
mandatory minimum sentencing will be repealed.1 31 All wars, however,
claim their victims. The victims of the war on drugs will include people
like Richard Anderson, who because of a one-time mistake in judgment,
will have spent ten dreary years away from the places, friends, and family
that make life worth living.
b. Zero Tolerance
"Zero Tolerance" was a creation of Commissioner of Customs Wil-
liam Von Raab. 32 Von Raab and others in the Reagan Administration
felt frustrated by an inability to reduce seriously the supply of illicit
128. The Crime Control Act of 1990 required the Sentencing Commission to prepare a
report on the effects of mandatory minimum sentences. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1703, 104 Stat.
4789, 4845 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
129. In August 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a special report to Congress
entitled Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 4 FED. SEN-
TENCE REP. 231 (1991) [hereinafter Special Report]. The General Accounting Office has con-
ducted its own study of mandatory sentences. The report was to be submitted to Congress by
the end of 1992. Edward M. Kennedy, Foreward: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Symposium,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. ix, xi (1992).
130. The report of the Sentencing Commission suggests that Congress should consider re-
peal of mandatory minimum sentence provisions. Special Report, supra note 129.
131. According to Senator Edward Kennedy, the "decision to exclude mandatory mini-
mum penalties from the 1990 crime bill is a good sign that the tide is turning, and that a
majority in Congress is beginning to recognize that the proliferation of mandatory minimum
sentences is counterproductive." Robert F. Howe, Drug Sentencing Faulted, WAsH. POST,
Feb. 25, 1991, at DI, D4 (quoting Sen. Kennedy).
132. The Zero Tolerance policy was adopted by the National Drug Policy Board, a cabi-
net-level group, in March of 1988. "Zero Tolerance" Drug Policy and Confiscation of Property:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1988) (statement of Commissioner William
Von Raab).
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drugs. 133 The decision was made to lower demand by raising the penal-
ties for drug users. Under Zero Tolerance, drug users undeterred by the
often insignificant risk of imprisonment now had to weigh a more sub-
stantial risk of losing valuable property. 134
Asset forfeiture was an enforcement tool well before Zero Tolerance.
Zero Tolerance, however, expanded the use of civil forfeiture to cases
involving small quantities of drugs. Previously, only confiscation of con-
traband was likely to result from the discovery of drugs. Civil forfeiture
in general has been a very popular tool among law enforcement person-
nel. There is added incentive to use the forfeiture penalty because profits
from the forfeiture program are channelled back to law enforcement
programs. 135
Less than two months after Zero Tolerance took effect on March 21,
1988, the Customs Service had seized over 700 vehicles, and the Coast
Guard had seized twenty-seven boats, including Hogan's Hold Tight.13 6
Hogan's case was not the only case involving the seizure of valuable com-
mercial property. On the Canadian border at Blaine, Washington, Cus-
toms officers seized a $100,000 rig when they discovered a marijuana
cigarette in the cab. 137 In Key West, Florida, the Coast Guard seized a
seventy-three-foot fishing boat and sold its eight-day haul of fish for
$5,827, after officials discovered three grams of marijuana seeds and
stems on board. 3  The most valuable property seized in the first month
of Zero Tolerance's operation was the $2.5 million yacht Ark RoyaL The
Coast Guard found one-tenth of an ounce of marijuana aboard the
chartered boat.'39 As if to prove that Zero Tolerance really meant zero
tolerance, officials have also seized property in cases where only minus-
cule quantities of drugs had been discovered. One woman in Washington
had her car impounded after Customs inspectors used tweezers to re-
133. Id.
134. Before the Zero Tolerance policy took effect on March 21, 1988, Coast Guard person-
nel finding small amounts of marijuana in routine checks of crafts usually just tossed it over-
board. Customs officials handled discoveries of small amounts of drugs in a similar way. Jon
Nordheimer, Tighter Federal Drug Dragnet Yields Cars, Boats and Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1988, at 1.
135. The Drug Enforcement Administration has acquired more than two billion dollars in
seized assets since 1985. (In 80% of cases persons whose property has been seized do not
contest it). Jim Newton, Seizure of House Raises Concerns on Drug War, Civil Libertarians
Say, L.A. TIME, Apr. 2, 1992, at B1.
136. Pete Yost, "Zero Tolerance" Drug Battle Called Overkill, CHi. TRIB., May 16, 1988,
at 9.
137. Nordheimer, supra note 134, at 1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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move one-tenth of a gram of marijuana from the bottom of her purse."4
Targets of Zero Tolerance may regain their property eventually. In
some cases, officials apparently have recognized the injustice involved
and returned property after payment of a fine and seizure fee. 141 In other
cases, those whose property has been seized can only hope that the gov-
ernment fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized
property was either purchased with drug profits or used in committing a
drug crime. Acquittal in a criminal case does not affect the government's
standard of proof in a later forfeiture suit. 42
The seizure of Kevin Hogan's fishing boat at the height of the
Alaska fishing season because a crew member possessed marijuana was a
penalty disproportionate to his crime. Even if one recognizes a duty of
boat owners to hire drug-free employees, the failure to do so certainly
registers a rather low level of blameworthiness. Scant evidence exists to
show marijuana to be a significant long-term health risk.l4 1 Although
marijuana causes reduced mental and physical levels of functioning, it is
absurd to argue that pot in the pocket of a fisherman represents the pub-
lic risk that it might, say, in the hands of a United Airlines 747 pilot. A
$140,000 fine and possible bankruptcy is not an appropriate penalty for
inadequate attention to a crew member's drug use. There will be close
calls in forfeiture cases, but this is not one of them.
Only thoughtlessness, the handmaiden of evil, can explain a gross
injustice like the seizure of the Hold Tight. It is easy for "generals" in
the War on Drugs, such as Commissioner Van Raab, to avoid consider-
ing how their drug enforcement policies may affect a fisherman 5000
miles away; their focus remains on larger goals, their preoccupation with
the movement of pieces on war room maps. More difficult to explain are
the actions of "lieutenants" in regional offices. Their blindness to injus-
tice may stem from a belief that aggressive pursuit of forfeiture cases will
advance their careers, or it may be the result of benefitting too directly
from the windfall proceeds of the forfeitures they authorize.
c. Project Looking Glass
Child pornography had been all but eradicated in the United States
when the Federal Government began sending advertisements and letters
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (1975) (holding the private possession of
marijuana to be protected by the Alaska Constitution and concluding that the health risks of
marijuana are small); Jefferson Morley, Our Puritan Dilemma, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1,
1986, at 13.
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to people like Robert Brase. The Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography reported in 1986 that federal statutes enacted in the 1970s
aimed at child pornography distributors had "effectively halted the bulk
of the commercial child pornography industry." 1" The report also sug-
gested that 1984 federal statutes criminalizing the receipt of child por-
nography had largely eliminated the market for noncommercial child
pornography. 45 Even at its height, the child pornography problem was
largely a myth. The entire commercial industry is estimated to have gen-
erated only one million dollars in the decade ending in 1982, an insignifi-
cant share of the pornography market. 4 6 One distributor alone was
estimated to have accounted for over eighty percent of the market.'47 A
number of experts agree that only 5000 to 7000 minors worldwide have
ever appeared in commercial child pornography; most of these children
live outside the United States. 148
By far the largest advertiser, manufacturer, and distributor of child
pornography is the United States Government.' 49 In its zeal to promote
itself as the protector of family values, the government has implemented
elaborate sting operations 50 to identify and capture individuals such as
Robert Brase, many of whom had never before purchased child pornog-
raphy. Some, like Nebraska farmer Keith Jacobson, who successfully
brought his case to the Supreme Court, had indicated to the government
that they had little interest in child pornography. 5 ' The government,
144. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 143 & n.17 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 1
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL RE-
PORT 607 (1986)).
145. Id.
146. Lawrence A. Stanley, The Child Porn Myth, 7 CAPDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 320-
21(1989).
147. Id. at 320.
148. Id. at 307-09.
149. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 11, Jacobson v. United States, 60 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992)
(No. 90-1124).
150. Stanley, supra note 146, at 322-30.
151. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537-40 (1992). In response to a govern-
ment questionnaire, supposedly sent by the "American Hedonist Society," Jacobson indicated
that his interest in "[pire-teen sex-homosexual" material was above average, but not high. Id.
at 1538. Justice White noted that when Jacobson finally placed his order for the pornographic
material, he had already been the target of 26 months of repeated mailings and communica-
tions from Government agents and fictitious organizations. Id. at 1536. Justice White
concluded
the strong arguable inference is that, by waving the banner of individual rights and
disparaging the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the availability
of sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited [petitioner's] interest
in material banned by law but also exerted substantial pressure on [petitioner] to
obtain and read such material as part of the fight against censorship and the infringe-
ment of individual rights.
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however, would not always take "no" for an answer.
Project Looking Glass, the sting investigation which resulted in
Robert Brase's arrest, was created by Post Office Inspector Ray Mack. 152
Mack originally envisioned Looking Glass as an intelligence-gathering
operation, 113 with the focus to remain on apprehending distributors. 54
There were no plans to sell or distribute child pornography to anyone. 5'
Administration officials in Washington decided to elevate Looking
Glass to the major sting operation it became.1 5 6 Calvin Comfort was a
postal inspector whose job was to implement Project Looking Glass in
the midwest region. 57 Comfort identified possible targets, wrote adver-
tisements, analyzed responses to advertisements, and frequently became
a "pen pal" to targets who exhibited reluctance to order the porno-
graphic materials. Writing under pseudonyms such as "Carl Long,"
Comfort employed "mirroring techniques" in which "Long" expressed a
shared interest in whatever sexual inclinations his targets' letters re-
vealed. 5 ' In these letters, Comfort/"Long" emphasized his interest in
discreetness. Typical is the language in one of the three letters sent to a
sting target: "I agree with you about privacy. I am real discrete [sic] but
still our conservative society wants to pry into private lives." '159
There is no evidence to suggest that Robert Brase or most of the
other targets of Project Looking Glass were child molesters or had ever
engaged in sexual activity with minors. In fact, the vast majority of per-
sons who exhibit an interest in child pornography pose no threat of com-
mitting criminal sexual activity with minors. 60
Id. at 1537.
152. Petitioner's Brief at 22, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
153. Id. at 28.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
158. Petitioner's Brief at 22, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
159. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
160. On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that most child molesters are regular
users of pornography. Detective William Dworin of the Los Angeles Police Department esti-
mates that "of the 700 preferential child molesters (pedophiles) in whose arrest he has partici-
pated during the last ten years, more than one half had child pornography in their possession
and about 80% owned [some type of] pornography." Amicus Curiae Brief for the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the National Law Center for Protection of
Children and Families at 12, Jacobson (No. 90-1124). Ron Langevin, an expert on pedophilia
and a Senior Research Psychologist at the University of Toronto, contends that most sex of-
fenders are exposed to pornography of the Penthouse variety, not child pornography. He as-
serts that "[t]he link between pornography and sexual crime has consistently been statistically
nonsignificant." Stanley, supra note 146, at 333.
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The stigma and shame associated with an interest in child pornogra-
phy led planners of the sting to "expect" suicides, 6' and, predictably,
four happened. Gary Hester, like Robert Brase, shot himself just prior to
arraignment.'62 Dale Riva committed suicide hours before his indict-
ment was to be announced publicly. 63 Thomas Cleasby left a suicide
note stating that he had been "'cursed with a demon for a sexual
preference.' "164
Left alone, Robert Brase would most likely have continued to lead a
quiet life on his Nebraska farm with his two children and his wife of ten
years. The world is not a safer place because of his absence. The death
of Brase is as random as it is tragic. Brase's decision to order legally a
videotape from a California distributor, the government's decision to
conduct the raid on that California distributor, the discovery as a result
of the raid of the mailing list that included Brase's name, Brase's decision
not to move in the years following his videotape order to a new address
that might have prevented the fatal solicitation from reaching its target,
and Brase's decision to respond affirmatively to the solicitation: Life
should not turn upon such things.
What would have happened if the designers and implementers of
Project Looking Glass had, before any of this started, visited the Ne-
braska farmhouse of Robert Brase and talked with him? Would Robert
Showers, director of the Department of Justice's National Obscenity En-
forcement Unit, still refer to his suicide as an acceptable risk? Would
"Carl Long" have been willing to write the letters that won Brase's confi-
dence and resulted in his mail orders? Would they instead have called
the whole thing off?
The stories of Richard Anderson, Kevin Hogan, and Robert Brase
illustrate the tragic human consequences which stem from overidentifica-
tion with popular causes. Their losses differ from those of many others
only in degree.
The stories of the government officials responsible for the fates of
Anderson, Hogan, Brase, and thousands in similar positions demonstrate
that evil often has a very human face. Senator Byrd, Commissioner Von
Raab, or Obscenity Enforcement Director Showers derived no sadistic
pleasure from the suffering of Anderson, Hogan, or Brase. They scarcely
knew (if they knew at all) those persons who were most adversely af-
161. H. Robert Showers, executive director of the Department of Justice's National Ob-
scenity Enforcement Unit, said that, given the nature of the sting, "something like suicide is to
be expected." Kuznik, supra note 82, at 45.
162. See Stanley, supra note 146, at 325 & n.149.
163. See id.
164. Id. (quoting A Fresh Assault on an Ugly Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 64-65).
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fected by their decisions. As identification with a popular cause slips into
overidentification, blindness to the consequences of one's decisions corre-
spondingly increases, as does the probability of working evil.
. Elevation of Docket Management
Docket management problems rival overidentification as a cause of
evil in our legal system. There is no dispute that the volume of cases in
our court system has reached a crisis level. In response, the legal system
has placed great importance on caseload reduction. In an effort to meet
these demands, many courts have elevated docket management concerns
above concerns for individual's rights.
All professional cultures are subject to internal demands, in addition
to the demands of a larger society. These demands may differ from those
of the official law and larger society.16 Many of the internal legal de-
mands on the legal system relate to methods of legal reasoning. Attor-
neys feel compelled to present arguments in certain ways, and judges feel
compelled to explain their decisions in forms of generally accepted legal
reasoning. Another set of internal demands relates to increases in the
volume of civil and criminal cases that must be processed. Pressure has
grown to develop rules that will promote efficient processing of cases.
Frequently, this translates into pressure to reach decisions that discour-
age resort to the courts. This nearly obsessive concern for solving docket
management problems has produced tortured legal reasoning and has
made institutional indifference to individual suffering almost fashionable.
One cannot know whether the Supreme Court's concern with
docket management problems formed part of a chain of events leading to
the 1992 riots in Los Angeles following the Rodney King beating case.
166
What is known is that almost nine years before the country watched the
videotaped beating of King by four Los Angeles police officers, the
Supreme Court had confronted a similar showing of violence by the
LAPD. Even if City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 167 fell short of endorsing the
Los Angeles police department's notoriously rough tactics, 168 it certainly
had to be considered good news by then-Police Chief Daryl Gates.
Adolph Lyons was a twenty-four year old black male whom two
Los Angeles police officers stopped because one of his taillights was
165. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 225
(1975).
166. Timothy Egan, After the Riots, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al.
167. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
168. Richard Serrano, Understanding the Riots-Six Months Later: A New Blue Line/Re-
making the LAPD; A New Direction, A Long Road, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1992, at JJ3.
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burned out.169 Even though Lyons complied fully with police com-
mands, one of the officers continued to choke the handcuffed Lyons until
he blacked out.'7 After Lyons regained consciousness he spat up blood
and dirt, urinated, and defecated. 7' In one sense, Lyons was lucky; in
the eight previous years, no less than sixteen persons had died following
the use of a chokehold by LAPD officers. 72 Rejecting Lyon's claim for
injunctive relief, the Supreme Court instead erected a new standing bar-
rier to persons seeking review of police department policies. 173 Justice
Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, noted that the Court's decision "im-
munizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that authorizes per-
sistent deprivations of constitutional rights so long as no individual can
establish with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured
again, in the future."'1 4 The suffering of Adolph Lyons produced little
more than a shrug from the Court: "Of course, it may be that among the
countless encounters between the police and the citizens of a great city
such as Los Angeles, there will be certain instances in which strangle
holds will be illegally applied and injury and death unconstitutionally
inflicted on the victim.' 75 Of course.
A strong desire to reduce caseloads undoubtedly is a driving force
behind many recent decisions dealing with criminal law and suspects'
and prisoners' rights.1 76 It explains how courts could conclude that it is
not a constitutional violation for a state to execute an innocent person,1 77
or that decisions of trial judges not to depart downward from sentencing
guidelines are unreviewable, T8 or that it is possible for a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy to exist that does not include protection against
routine body cavity searches of persons awaiting trial. 179 Taken collec-
169. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 114.
170. Id. at 115.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 115-16.
173. Id. at 105-10.
174. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 108.
176. Nancy Levit, Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 350-52 (1989).
177. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2523 (1992) (holding that whenever a claim of
actual innocence is raised in a second petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner must
show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty),
The Supreme Court considered whether the execution of an innocent person violates the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments in Herrara v. Collins, 61 U.S.L.W. 4108 (U.S. Tex. Jan. 25,
1993). The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision denying federal review of new evidence
suggesting the petitioner's actual innocence. Id.
178. See, eg., United States v. Cipollone, 951 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1990)).
179. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
tively these decisions reveal a judiciary that has moved steadily toward
an aggregated, empirical approach to justice, and away from individual-
ized justice.
It is often difficult to determine the degree to which docket manage-
ment concerns affected decisions in particular cases. Most judges under-
stand that justice is supposed to be individual; they cannot, without
embarrassment, justify decisions primarily on the basis of serving docket
management goals. Never will a judge be so candid as to write in her
opinion, "Plaintiff loses despite having the facts and the law in his favor
because I am convinced that a decision for the plaintiff 'will encourage
too many less worthy lawsuits." When hunting for evidence of cases in
which docket management concerns were controlling, it is usually neces-
sary to look beyond the four corners of judicial opinions. It is necessary
to look at the briefs of litigants, caseload statistics, and patterns of judi-
cial decisionmaking.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to gauge how frequently concerns
about judicial caseloads are deciding cases. Rather, the goal is to demon-
strate that the elevation of docket management concerns rivals overiden-
tification with popular causes as the largest cause of injustice in the
American legal system today. Two stories, one implicating a single court
of appeals and another implicating a large part of the federal appellate
judiciary, are offered in support of that proposition.
1. An Individual's Story-Keith J. Hudson
Keith J. Hudson successfully sued correctional officers for a beating
they inflicted at the state penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. 18 0 What is
remarkable about the case is not that the Court permitted Hudson to
keep the $800 in damages awarded at his trial, but rather that a unani-
mous panel of Fifth Circuit judges would have taken it away from
him."'1 While Judges Politz, Davis, and Barksdale joined in "deploring
the use of unnecessary force in the treatment of prisoners,"1 8 2 they con-
cluded that Hudson's injuries from the beating failed to meet the Cir-
cuit's "significant injury" requirement to prove violations of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 8 3
The beating of Keith Hudson took place in the early morning hours
180. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 997-98 (1992).
181. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995
(1992). The panel judges included Judges Politz, Davis, and Barksdale. id. at 1014.
182. Id. at 1015.
183. Id.
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of October 30, 1983.184 Hudson and an inmate in an adjacent cell had
argued.185 Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian approached Hudson's
cell, "6 handcuffed and shackled Hudson, removed him from his cell, and
led him to administrative lockdown. 1 7 On the way there, McMillian
told Woods to hold Hudson still so he could "knock the gold teeth out"
of Hudson's mouth."'8 While Woods held the prisoner's jumpsuit,
McMillian punched Hudson in the eye, chest, and mouth. Arthur Mezo,
a correctional supervisor, observed this beating and told the two guards
"not to have too much fun."189 Hudson was left with bruised lips, a
black eye, and a swollen cheek. 90 For several months, a cracked dental
plate prevented him from eating normally.191
The Fifth Circuit's "significant injury" requirement was fashioned
in response to the rising tide of civil rights lawsuits filed by prisoners. In
a one-year period ending March 31, 1991, prisoners filed 24,905 civil
rights lawsuits in the federal courts; in the Fifth Circuit alone, 3,355 such
suits were filed.' 92 An amicus brief filed by the States of Texas, Hawaii,
Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida praised the Fifth Circuit's significant in-
jury test as an "objective method for winnowing the wheat from the
chaff."'193 The brief reported that "[t]he significant injury requirement
has been very effective in the Fifth Circuit in helping to control ...
docket management problems." 194
While the significant injury requirement may assist the Fifth Circuit
in controlling its caseload, it also has the effect, as the United States
pointed out in its amicus brief, of allowing torture, so long as it leaves no
lasting marks.1 95 For example, it would permit the use of the "Tucker
Telephone," a hand-cranked device that was used in Arkansas prisons in
184. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
185. Hudson v. McMillian, No. 83-1385-A, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. Apr. 30, 1987).
186. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
187. Id.
188. Joint Appendix at 6, Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (No. 90-6531).
189. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Brief for Texas, Hawaii, Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida as Amici Curiae at 15 n.12,
Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (No. 90-6531) (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD
ENDED MARCH 31, 1991).
193. Id. at 15.
194. Id.
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct.
995 (1992) (No. 90-6531).
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the 1960s to administer electrical shocks to sensitive parts of the body.1 96
So long as the resulting injuries were neither permanent nor required
hospitalization, prisoners would be fair game under the Fifth Circuit's
test.
Two well-known studies of prison and guard behavior have docu-
mented the danger of loosening constraints in the prison environment.
One study conducted at Stanford University assigned students to the
roles of "prisoners" and "guards" for what was to be a two-week experi-
ment. 197 When researchers noted escalating levels of harassment and ag-
gression directed against students dressed as prisoners, especially in the
researchers' absence, they felt compelled to terminate the experiment af-
ter only six days.1 98 As this study demonstrated, circumstances can elicit
sadistic behavior from people who are not by nature sadistic. Stanley
Milgram, whose 1965 study is considered a classic, reached a similar con-
clusion. I99 Milgram found that subjects would, when instructed to do so
by an authority figure, administer what they believed were increasingly
high levels of electrical shocks despite their victims' complaints, pleas to
stop, and even shrieks of agony.2
Prisons are places where evil in its direct, sadistic fbrm is far too
often found. In 1986, the Ninth Circuit considered the complaint of an
inmate who suffered ruptured hemorrhoids when a prison guard at-
tempted to plunge a riot stick into the prisoner's anus.20 I In the same
year, the Sixth Circuit considered a case where a correctional officer had
waived a knife in a paraplegic prisoner's face, extorted food from him,
and failed to relay requests for medical care so that he lay in his own
feces for hours.202
Nothing in prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court re-
quired the Fifth Circuit to adopt its "significant injury" test. It was
plainly and simply an attempt by the Fifth Circuit to reduce the volume
196. The use of the "Tucker Telephone" is described in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682
& n.5 (1978).
197. Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT'L J. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 72-74 (1973).
198. Id. at 80-81, 89. The experiment is described in Petitioner's Brief at 24-25 n.20, Hud-
son (No. 90-6531).
199. Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience in Authority, 18
HUM. REL. 57, 61 (1965). For a chilling account of the sadism of normal men in abnormal
circumstances see CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTAL-
ION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (Harper Collins 1992).
200. Milgram, supra note 199, at 61.
201. The Ninth Circuit found an Eighth Amendment violation. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795
F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986).
202. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that the facts estab-
lished an Eighth Amendment violation).
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of prisoner cases coming before it. It seems clear that few federal appel-
late judges have much interest in prisoner complaints; they came to the
bench to decide antitrust cases. Fortunately, in Hudson, seven members
of the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to adopt the significant
injury test as a docket control measure.2"3 Justice Blackmun found "au-
dacious" the suggestion "that the interpretation of an explicit constitu-
tional protection is to be guided by pure policy preferences for the paring
down of prisoner petitions." 2" Justice O'Connor, speaking for the
Court, found that the Fifth Circuit's decision implicitly "ignore[d] the
'concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' that an-
imate the Eighth Amendment."20 5
2. An Institutional Story-The Courts of Appeals and Interpretation
of Sentencing Guidelines
In the years since the 1987 implementation of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 20 6 the courts of appeals have transformed a well-inten-
tioned, although imperfect, attempt to reduce sentencing disparities into
an oppressively mechanistic regime. Some trial judges, finding that their
sentencing discretion has been restricted far beyond whatever Congress
or the Sentencing Commission ever intended, believe that "a foolish and
illusory consistency has become the hobgoblin of the Federal courts. 2 7
Remarkably, the Sentencing Commission, whose guideline sentence
ranges are becoming increasingly inescapable, appears not to appreciate
fully this inflexible trend of appellate decisions. District Judge Lawrence
203. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1002 (1992).
204. Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 1001 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 419 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968))).
206. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1991). The
federal guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987. Many judges, however, considered
the guidelines unconstitutional and applied them only after the Supreme Court ruled the
guidelines constitutional in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
207. David Margolick, Justice By the Numbers: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1992, at Al. The Sentencing Commission itself has recognized that judges have "an obligation
to consider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in
an appropriate case." United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 278 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235). Nonetheless, appellate courts have
strongly discouraged use of this so-called departure power. See, e.g., United States v. Poff, 926
F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 96 (1991); United States v. Pharr,
916 F.2d 129, 131-33 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991); United States v,
Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138-40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 353 (1990).
Despite appellate court discouragement of the departure power, Judge Vincent Broderick,
head of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, has
urged district judges to depart more frequently from the guidelines. Margolick, supra, at A40.
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K. Karlton wrote in a letter to editors of the Federal Sentencing
Reporter:
Perhaps my most enlightening experience (at the Sentencing In-
stitute of the National Judicial Center) were my conversations
with members of the Commission and their staff. These folks
repeatedly asserted that the district judges who are dissatisfied
with the guidelines have ample opportunity to affect them
through the device of departure. The fact that the courts of
appeal had transformed the product of the Commission's effort
from guidelines into law, permitting departures under only the
most limited of circumstance, either was unknown, unap-
preciated or ignored in favor of a fiction which no one familiar
with the way the system actually worked could take
seriously. °8
What may be behind the inflexible interpretation that has character-
ized appellate court treatment of the Commission's guidelines is a hostil-
ity towards sentencing cases. Over 1000 sentencing cases a year have
clogged the courts of appeals since the guidelines went into effect.20 9
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act,210 only a handful of sentencing
cases reached the appellate courts each year.211 The decisions of courts
of appeals make sense when viewed as an effort to reduce the total vol-
ume of sentencing eases that are appealed.
The sentencing system created by Congress left trial judges free in
certain cases to depart from sentencing ranges established by the United
States Sentencing Commission. Congress authorized departures when
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described. ' 212 The statutory lan-
guage makes clear that even when the Commission has indicated a belief
that a particular circumstance generally should not be a basis for depar-
ture, it may be when the circumstance is especially compelling (present
"to a degree" not adequately considered). For example, one could argue
that despite the decision of the Commission generally to exclude age as a
relevant mitigating factor in sentencing,21 3 a court may be justified in
208. 4 FED. SENTENCE REP. 186 (1991) (Nov. 20, 1991, letter to editors of Reporter).
209. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 906 & n.17.
210. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988)).
211. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 906.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
213. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS
§ 5H 1.1. (1987) (Age Policy Statement).
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doing so when the defendant is, for example, eighty-eight years old. The
statutory language also indicates that mere consideration of a circum-
stance by the Commission will not exclude it as a basis for departure;
exclusion is required only when the consideration is found to be "ade-
quate." Finally, one might conclude from the statutory language that
trial judges often could justify departure by identifying a circumstance
"of a kind" that is not one of the "kinds" considered by the Sentencing
Commission.
For the most part, however, the courts of appeals have foreclosed
these routes of escape from the often harsh sentences the guidelines im-
pose. The "to a degree" language of the statute has been largely ig-
nored.214 Commission consideration of a circumstance has been found to
be "adequate" even where there is scant evidence to support that conclu-
sion. Appellate courts have defined broadly categories of "kinds" of cir-
cumstances considered by the Commission, thus requiring even more
ingenuity on the part of trial judges who believe that a defendant's cir-
cumstance justifies departure. As further incentive to trial judges to stay
within guidelines, several courts of appeals have concluded, without
much logic on their side, that decisions not to depart from guidelines are
unreviewable. 15
Courts of appeals often have rejected attempts by trial judges to tai-
lor sentences to the circumstances of individual cases while expressing
regret that the law should force such a harsh result. For example, the
First Circuit reversed Judge C. Weston Houck's decision to depart down-
ward from sentencing guidelines because of the defendant's pregnancy,
with the suggestion that "judicial compassion ... cannot be condoned
when it results, as in this case, in individual sentencing contrary to the
214. See Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459 (1988) (suggesting there is too much discretion); Marc Miller,
True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587 (1992) (critical analysis
of the sentencing grid); see generally Judy Clarke & Gerald McFadden, Departures from the
Guideline Range: Have We Missed the Boat, or Has the Ship Sunk?, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
919, 920 (1992) (arguing that there is "only a rebuttable presumption that an individual sen-
tence should be within the applicable Guideline range").
215. "[A] district court's discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guide-
lines is not subject to review on appeal." United States v. Cipollone, 951 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1990)); cf United
States v. Lee, 887 F.2d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 1989) (failure of district court to depart downward
from Guidelines not at issue since case was remanded for resentencing because no guidelines
were applicable to the offense). Judge Becker argues that for cases falling outside the "heart-
land," "a district court's refusal to depart cannot be squared with the overall sentencing
scheme envisioned by Congress." United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 281 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). Such a refusal to depart, Becker believes, may be a violation of law under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 275 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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intent and command of the guidelines. 216 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
Judge G. Ernest Tidwell's attempt to depart downwardly from guidelines
because of the minor nature of the defendant's prior convictions (e.g., the
defendant stole a purse containing $5.35), while acknowledging that "the
result in this case is arguably harsh. ' 217 Judge Walter J. Skinner sought
to depart from the guidelines by reducing a sentence in a pornography
possession case involving a forty-one year old man with no criminal rec-
ord, noting that "imprisonment will simply prevent the defendant from
continuing to be a useful person and will add nothing to the public
safety.1 218 The appellate court overturned the departure, commenting
that "[a]lthough the district court's sense of compassion and pragmatism
... is understandable, regrettably, these considerations are insufficient to
justify a downward departure." '219
Other courts of appeals have reversed downward departures without
any apparent regret. One court coldly held that a mandatory prison sen-
tence that forced a female defendant to leave her three small children
with her ill mother a thousand miles away failed to justify a downward
departure. The court noted that the "imposition of prison sentences nor-
mally disrupts family relationships."220 In another example, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the obvious mental illness of a woman convicted
of writing threatening letters to the President could not serve as the basis
for a downward departure.221 The defendant was a long-term victim of
sexual abuse who believed that her deceased father had commanded her
to commit the crime.222 Despite her mental illness and the court's con-
cession that "she never intended to carry out her threats,, 223 the Seventh
Circuit, through a determinedly technical parsing of the Commission's
guidelines, held downward departure unlawful.224
The refusal of appellate courts to accept broad use of the departure
power has created frustrated and unhappy district court judges. Some
216. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 140 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 353
(1990).
217. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 551 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2056 (1991).
218. United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 256-57.
220. William Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCE REP. 339,
340 (1991).
221. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 96
(1991).
222. Id. at 590.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 593. Judges Coffey, Cudahy, Easterbrook, Marrion, and Posner dissented. Id.
at 593-96. For a criticism of Poff, see Alschuler, supra note 14, at 911.
19931 .EVIL 1145
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
have vented their frustrations in judicial decisions; others have opposed
the guidelines and their implementation in public speeches and open let-
ters. One judge recently resigned over the sentencing.221 Still others
have "done their duty," albeit with the utmost reluctance.
Some trial court decisions have been highly critical of the lack of
sentencing discretion. In a recent decision, Judge Glasser of New York
pointedly noted that the defendant before him for sentencing was "a per-
son, rather than an objective manifestation of discrete criteria to which
are assigned numbers which, when added together, yield a sentencing
result." 226 Judge Terrance T. Evans expressed a similar view when he
wrote that "[i]ndividualized justice, which should be the due of anyone
convicted in an American courtroom, has been replaced with a system of
grids, points, and mindless absurdities. 22 7 Judge McNichols's contempt
for the guidelines was evident in an opinion in which he complained that
discretion has shifted "from persons who have demonstrated essential
qualifications to the satisfaction of their peers, various investigatory
agencies, and the United States Senate to persons who may be barely out
of law school with scant life experience and whose common sense may be
an unproven asset."'22  Judge William Schwarzer expressed the moral
qualms many judges apparently have with the harsh sentencing rules
when he complained that the rule of law has been "drained of the sem-
blance of justice." '229 Another district judge is reported to have won-
dered, "only half-jokingly, whether in years to come he and his fellow
jurists will have to assert the Nuremberg Defense-'I was only following
orders'-to justify the number of people they are sending to prison for
decades." '230
California District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton discerned a "seem-
ing lack of interest at the appellate level" '231 in sentencing issues that is
remarkable in view of the widespread and intense interest in the subject
reported at the trial court level. Why have appellate judges interpreted
sentencing guidelines so inflexibly when their district court brethren re-
225. Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22.
Judge Irving was named to the federal bench in July, 1982 by President Reagan. Id.
226. Schwarzer, supra note 220, at 341.
227. United States v. Scott, 757 F. Supp. 972, 972-73 (E.D. Wis. 1991), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Thomas, 969 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 274 (1992).
228. United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637 (E.D. Wa. 1990), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991).
229. United States v. Anderson (N.D. Cal. 1989) (transcript of proceedings) (quoted at 2
FED. SENTENCE REP. 185 (1990)).
230. Scott, 757 F. Supp. at 980 (quoting Micheal Isikoff & Tracy Thompson, Getting Too
Tough on Drugs, WAsH. POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at 25).
231. 4 FED. SENTENCE REP. 186 (1991) (Nov. 20, 1991, letter to editors).
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main so strongly supportive of more sentencing discretion? The answer
lies in distance. Appellate judges enjoy a distance from criminal defend-
ants that trial judges do not. Appellate judges rarely, if ever, meet indi-
vidual defendants or their families. They are familiar in only a general
way with how years in prison can shatter families or dreams. Individual
defendants are names on legal papers whose accumulation in their offices
represents for most appellate judges a distraction from the types of issues
that most concern and excite them. What California District Judge Ir-
ving called the "heavy" '232 burden of sentencing-a burden that finally
convinced Irving to resign-is lightened considerably when the defend-
ant is remote, and the job is shared and routine.
Distance from the human consequence of one's decisions can breed
the indifference and lack of imagination that Hannah Arendt found so
closely linked to evil. Empathy, which is the enemy of evil, comes from
our ability to imagine the details of another's life. When knowledge of
another's life is reduced to a paragraph or two in a written brief, oppor-
tunities for empathy are limited, if not foreclosed altogether. Only those
appellate judges with especially fertile imaginations or with great deter-
mination to think hard about the consequences of their decisions are at
low risk of "working evil." The temptation is often strong to turn what
should be questions of fairness and justice into questions of expediency or
personal interest.
II. THE RESPONSE TO EVIL
The diffusion of power in the United States has proven to be, as
James Madison imagined it would, a powerful check on evil and injus-
tice. When the zealotry or shortsightedness of one branch of government
produces injustice, therefore, there remains hope that another branch
may see fit to correct it. When an individual state government becomes
captured by a group that might deprive others of their basic liberties, one
can look to Washington for possible relief. Even within the Executive
Branch of the federal government, the political muscle of one agency can
counteract another that has become beholden to special interests. To be
sure, these checks on injustice are much more likely to have real effect
when the victims of the injustice are themselves persons with political
clout, or the focus of media attention, or so numerous and visible that
their suffering can hardly be ignored.
Although the effects of evil cannot always be erased, future injus-
232. Federal Judge Quits Over Sentencing Rules, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1990, at 6. Judge
Irving added that he has had "a problem with mandatory sentencing in almost every case
that's come before me .... I just can't do it any more." Id.
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tices might be prevented, when news of injustices flows freely and there
are concerned people to receive it. For example, news of the implemen-
tation of Zero Tolerance was widely publicized (the seizure of $2.5 mil-
lion yachts is a good story and one that powerful interests wanted to get
out).233 Within weeks after it began, members of Congress grilled Com-
missioner Von Raab and others about what generally was perceived as an
extreme and indefensible policy.234 Legislation was hastily introduced to
provide defenses for "innocent owners of vessels seized for drug viola-
tions." '235 As a result, a modicum of reasonableness soon crept into Zero
Tolerance.
A judicial conference study of the effect of mandatory minimum
sentences has prompted proposals to repeal or modify provisions in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.236 It is not just the individual injustices, such as
the case of Richard Anderson, that have brought calls for reform. With
prison populations expected to double by 1997 and nearly triple by 2002,
concerns over spiraling prison costs have risen.237 Over half of all federal
prisoners are now serving time on drug charges, and the percentage is
increasing.238 Drug cases represent seventy to eighty-five percent of all
233. See, e.g., "Zero Tolerance"Drug Battle Called Overkill, CHL TRIB., May 16, 1988, at
9. The President of the Boat Owners Association of the United States personally protested the
seizure of the Ark Royal. The Association has 265,000 members among the country's esti-
mated 15 million boat owners. Id. Coast Guard officers charged with carrying out the Zero
Tolerance policy were reported as criticizing the policy. One officer said that the policy hurt
Coast Guard" 'morale more than it's hurting the smugglers.'" Jon Nordheimer, Tighter Fed-
eral Drug Dragnet Yields Cars, Boats and Protests, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 1988, at 1, 16. Gov-
ernment prosecutors expressed concern that they would lose Zero Tolerance forfeiture cases,
opening the door to a general weakening of forfeiture laws. As a result, few such cases were
tried. "'The government is scurrying to take reasonable positions,' and the '[prosecutors]
don't want to face a judge with one of these cases."' 134 CONG. REc. E1924, E1925 (daily ed.
June 10, 1988) (quoting Mark Thompson, Wide Seizure Net Snags War on Drugs, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 1988, at 16).
234. "Zero Tolerance" Drug Policy and Confiscation of Property: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-44 (1988).
235. 134 CONG. REc. Hll,108, Hi1,242 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (introduction of H.R.
5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)).
236. REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM. (April 2, 1990). At the state level, on
June 16, 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down as violative of that state's constitu-
tion the nation's toughest mandatory minimum sentence for a drug offense. The court found
that the law, which mandated a sentence of life without opportunity for parole for the posses-
sion of more than a pound and a half of cocaine, was "unduly disproportionate" to the crime.
Court Overturns a Tough Drug Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at B10. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in 1991, had held that the Michigan law did not violate the Eighth Amendment as cruel
and unusual punishment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701-02 (1991).
237. 136 CONG. REc. S8997, S8999 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy). The present federal prison population of 54,000 is expected to reach 109,000 by
1997 and 147,000 by 2002. Id.
238. The General Accounting Office reported that 57% of federal prisoners with no prior
federal cases in some jurisdictions, and civil litigation is being pushed off
the docket.239 The neglect of business litigation is beginning to squeeze
important interests who otherwise would not shed tears over the plight of
drug mules. Reform at some date thus appears inevitable.2'
In the instances of Project Looking Glass and the Fifth Circuit's
"significant injury" test in prison brutality cases, it was the Supreme
Court that redirected the misguided programs. Project Looking Glass
was effectively killed when the Court ruled that government implementa-
tion of Looking Glass constituted entrapment.241 The possibility of con-
tinuing Project Looking Glass was further lessened by the media
attention the Jacobson case received, including a segment on CBS's Sixty
Minutes.242 Keith Jacobson became more than a name on a legal docu-
ment. He was a sympathetic, slow-speaking, middle-aged farmer whose
image came into millions of living rooms. It became more difficult to be
indifferent to his plight.
The Court's rejection of the "significant injury" test in prison brutal-
ity cases points to two important differences between the Supreme Court
and courts of appeals. First, docket management is a concern of a differ-
ent sort for a court whose review is discretionary, not mandatory. Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court, although in some ways even farther removed
than the courts of appeals from the parties whose cases it hears, has the
resources, the committed personnel, and the institutional integrity to give
a greater hope that it is a repository of justice than intermediate federal
courts. Justice always? Of course not. But in comparison to the courts
of appeals, it is a better bet.
Concern about justice is the surest way to counter evil. We must
seek judges who believe passionately in the importance of individualized
justice. We should seek judges who understand that it is their job to
imprisonment records were drug offenders. Ninety-four percent of those drug offenders have
no history of violence. Id. at S9000.
239. Id. at S8999 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). Because mandatory sentences in
drug cases leave defendants with nothing to gain by plea bargaining to a lesser offense, a dis-
proportionately high number of drug cases go to trial. According to the 15-member Federal
Courts Study Committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the volume of drug cases is the
biggest problem now facing the federal courts. Bishop, supra note 63, at B16.
240. In December 1990, Congress refused to enact additional mandatory minimum
sentences until the results of the two studies were made available. Senator Edward Kennedy
said that the" 'decision to exclude mandatory minimum penalties from the 1990 crime bill is a
good sign that the tide is turning, and that a majority in Congress is beginning to recognize
that the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences is counterproductive.'" Robert F.
Howe, Drug Sentencing Faulted, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 1991, at DI, D4 (quoting Sen. Edward
Kennedy).
241. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
242. The program was aired on February 9, 1992.
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decide cases, and who do not become obsessed with docket management
goals. We should elect politicians who are willing at least to balance
concerns for justice with concerns for their own electability. We should
promote openness among those who are closest to injustices, so that their
revulsion is comprehended by those in a position to remedy the situation.
We should safeguard the right of the media to report injustices, including
enabling the media to access persons and documents that allow a more
complete understanding of the government's role. Above all, we should
strive to keep the "truth channels" open243 and avoid being swept away
by the tides of temporary enthusiasms.
243. CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE 217-38 (1991).
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